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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
VILATH B. MCDONALD and 
EVELYN BROUGH, 
Plaintiffs-Respondents, 
vs. 
BARTON BROTHERS INVESTMENT 
CORPORATION, 
Third-Party Plaintiff-
Respondent, 
vs. 
GOLDEN WEST DEVELOPMENT 
CORPORATION, INC., and 
L. A. CAMPBELL, 
Third-Party Defendants-
Appellants. 
-------
BRIEF OF THIRD-PARTY 
PLAINTIFF BARTON BROTHERS 
INVESTMENT CORPORATION, 
RESPONDENT 
Case No. 16974 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This was an action by plaintiffs for specific performance 
of real estate contract for two residential lots or for damages 
against the defendant-third-party plaintiff who interpleaded 
against third-party defendants for specific performance and/or 
damages claiming that defendant-third-party plaintiff had 
no obligation to provide said lots to plaintiff. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The third-party plaintiff seeks to affirm the judgment 
entered against third-party defendant, L. A. Campbell. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
By Uniform Real Estate.Contract agreement dated 
16 December 1970, Barton Brothers Investment Corporation 
contracted to purchase from the estate of B. o. Brough, 
deceased, approximately 22 acres of land situated in Davis 
County, Utah. (Plainti~f's Exhibit A}. The contract gave 
Barton the option to purchase additional acreage west 
of an oil pipe line: 
"Buyer shall have the option of buying or refusing 
to buy the acreage West of the Oil Pipe Lines 
except that Seller shall have the option- of 
retaining one lot West of said pipe lines, 
to be adjusted in said payment due June 1, 1975." 
Purchase price was $3,000.00 per acre payable June 1, 1975. 
Some time in June 1974 or prior thereto, Barton met 
third-party defendant, L. A. Campbell, at Tracy Collins 
Bank in Bountiful, Utah and discussed Barton's land he 
was purchasing from Brough. (TR 136, 144} Barton offered 
to sell the Brough land to Campbell for $8, 500 •. -00. ~an .acre. 
(TR 89) Barton told Campbell that plaintiffs, Violate.B. 
McDonald and Evelyn Brough, had an option to purchase 
two lots from the Brough property once it had been platted 
and recorded and any purchase by Campbell would need to 
be subject to plaintiffs' option to buy. Campbell ac-
knowledged at trial that he was aware of Barton's obliga-
tion to plaintiff for two lots (TR 137-138} and at that 
time Campbell made arrangements to "take care of the Brough 
-2-
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sisters ... " (TR 136-137) An Earnest Money Receipt and 
Offer to Purchase was drawn up between Barton and Campbell 
dated June 7, 1974 for the sale of the subject ground 
for $8,500.00 per acre. (Defendant's Exhibit 1) No 
mention of the Brough sisters' option for two lots was 
noted in defendant's exhibit 1. 
On-about the 29th of July, 1974, Barton met with 
the representatives of B. o. Brough's estate to pay the 
estate the. balance due on the contract of 16 December 
19.7 0. (Plaintiff's Exhibit A) At that closing, Jim 
Brough, representing the B. o. Brough estate and ·his 
sisters:, Violate.B. McDonald and-Evelyn Brough, .plaintiffs, 
requested an instrument in writing which would reflect 
the right of plaintiffs to select two lots when the land 
was platted.and recorded. Another Earnest Money Receipt 
and Offer to Purchase dated July 29, 1974 (Plaintiff's· 
Exhibit B) was signed by Barton as se-ller and plaintiffs 
as buyer reserving to plaintiffs the option to select 
two lots p:r;ovided that their s.election was made, (1) within 
10 days after the platt was re-corded with Kaysville City 
~and (2) provided there was tendered $5,000.00 for offsite 
imorovements within 30 days after completion of the offsite 
improvements in the subdivision immediately adjacent to 
said lots on the basis of $2,500.00 per lot. 
-3-
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At the time of the closing on the Brough contract, 
$3,000.00 was placed in escrow for acreage adjustment 
and to assure plaintiffs value for two lots if they exer-
cised their option. {TR 122) Broughs conveyed the subject 
land to Barton by Warranty Deed dated 15 July 1974 and 
recorded 30 July 1974. {Defendant's Exhibit 4) 
Barton and Campbell met again at Tracy Collins Bank, 
Bountiful, on or about August 18, 1974 to "close" the 
transaction on . the sale of the ground. Ivir. John Busk, 
representing Tracy Collins Bank, prepared a closing· state-
ment dated August 18, 1974. {Defendant's Exhibit 2) 
That closing statement under the category ·of Sales Price 
showed an escrow account, 1 acre, $8,500.00. Campbell 
acknowledged (TR 98-99) tnat the purpose of the $8,500.00 
escrow was " ••. held back specifically to take care of 
the Brough girls." He further said that he felt the escrow 
took care of the whole situation and he felt with that 
money in escrow and having bought the land for $8,500.00 
per acre that they were well compensated and ahead. Barton 
also acknowledged that understanding between himself and 
Campbell (TR 154) and testified that Campbell agreed to 
honor the obligation due and owing the Brough sisters. 
At the time of the closing, Campbell requested that 
the deed from Barton, rather than showing Campbell Construc-
tion company as the grantee as called for in the Earnest 
-4-
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Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase (Defendant's Exhibit 
1), reflect Golden West Development Corporation as gr~ntee, 
a different corporation but one in which Campbell also 
held a principal interest. The deed dated 18 July 1974 
was subsequently recorded 30 July 1974. (Defendant's 
Exhibit 3) 
After Barton conveyed the land to Campbell the land 
was platted and recorded. Sales cormnenced through Secure 
Realty of Bountiful, an office owned and operated by Wayne 
Parkin, a partner of Campbell. Sales also were made by 
Brough through his office, Brough Realty, Kaysville, .. Utah. 
Mr. Brough subsequently contacted Parkin and asked 
that Parkin convey two lots to plaintiffs as he, Brough, 
had understood Campbell had agreed to do. Parkin said 
he did not understand fully the arrangements on the two 
lots and he would discuss the matter and notify Brough. 
Later Parkin told Brough that a meeting of the principal 
share holders of Golden West Dev~lopment Corporation had 
been called to discuss the matter of the Brough sisters' 
two lots. He informed Brough, " .•. it was the decision 
of the corporation that we would not acknowledge any 
agreement that he might or might not have entered into 
with a predecessor." (TR 130) Campbell said that he also 
informed Brough shortly thereafter in a telephone conversa-
tion: 
~s-
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A. I just told him that as far as we were 
concerned, we didn't have any obligation 
_on the transaction. ·_n.':t~' 
Q. Did you gi~e him any£xplanation as to 
that? 
A. No, that's all. {TR 139) 
Campbell testified that the two lot agreement would 
have been honored by himself and Golden West Development 
Corporation if Barton had come to Campbell and discussed 
the matter: 
A. I think Mr. Barton should have come to me when 
this came to a head and tried to sit down with 
with us and work a settlement out on it. If 
Mr. -- Jim Brough wanted these two lots, why he 
should have set down with Golden West and 
,_.-.,. worked out a negotiable price on these lots at 
the time, improved lots, which we would have 
done. But, he didn't contact me. 
Q. You would have done that had Mr. Barton come 
to you and said now is the time? 
A. Very definitely. If he would have come to us, 
those lots would have been open and we would 
have probably worked them out. But he would 
have had to compensate us for it. 
Q. And that was based upon your agreement with 
him previously I take it, is that correct? 
A. Right. 
Q. But you're saying that that's why you didn't 
put this thing together as you agreed to do 
because he never came and sat down with you? 
A. True. {TR 141-142) 
By letter of February 4, 1977, plaintiffs made demand 
on Barton for the two lots pursuant to the agreement of 
-6-
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July~29, 1974 .(Plaintiff's Exhibit B) or the comparable. 
value of those. lots. .Barton. could not .. comply. Suit was 
commenced .by ... plaintiffs. shortly thereafter. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
SINCE THE PRESENT ACTION WAS AN ACTION 
IN EQUITY FOR SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE AND 
MONEY DAMAGES WERE AWARDED ONLY AS AN 
ALTERNATIVE, THE DOCTRINE OF PART 
PERFORMANCE IS AVAILABLE. 
Appellant's argument that the Doctrine of Part Per-
formance is not available in an action at law for monetary 
damag~s for breach of an oral contract to convey land, 
was neither pleaded nor argued in the trial court, nor 
was the court's "alternate judgment" for money damages 
either formally or otherwise objected to by appellant 
at the time such ruling was made. (TR 184) In fact, 
when respondent Barton's counsel suggested that specific 
performance might still be possible, Mr. Fadel, appellant's 
counsel, argued against the possibility of specific per-
formance, in favor of money damages. (TR 190) At no 
time did appellant ever object to or express any disfavor 
with the court's ruiing that money damages should be paid 
as an alternative to specific performance where respond-
ent's part performance made ineffective the operation 
of the Statute of Frauds. 
-7-
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-Rule 46, Utah.,. Rules of Civil Proe-edure, states that 
while "Formal exceptions to rulings or orders of the Court 
are unnecessary," a party must, "at the time the ruling 
or order of the court is made or sought, make known 
to the court the action which he desires the court to 
take or his objection to the action of the court and his 
grounds therefore .•• " 
Although appellant had ample opportunity to object 
to the court's ruling against him on this issue, no where 
in the transcript is there evidence that appellant ever 
objected to the alternative decree of money damages or 
to the use of the Doctrine of Part Performance on the 
presently stated grounds. This being the case, appellant 
should not be allowed to raise such an objection on appeal. 
Had appellant stated such an objection to the court 
below, that court may not have given an alternate decree 
for money damages, but instead ~~y have more diligently 
inquired after the possibility of specific performance, 
as was suggested by respondent's counsel. (TR 190) 
Nevertheless, respondent Barton contends that appel-
lant's first argument is invalid on its fact. 
This was not an action only at law for monetary 
damages as appellant claims but rather, on the face of 
the pleadings as well as the ruling of the court, an action 
in equity for specific performance of appellant's promise. 
-8-
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Plaintiff's Complaint prayed as follows: 
1. For an Order of the Court requiring the defendan1s 
to provide to the plaintiffs the lots as agreed in the 
agreement. 
~· In the alternative for judgment against the defendant 
in an amount equal to the present value of the lots in 
question, together with interest ~1ereon at the legal 
rate. 
The prayer of the Third-Party Complaint was: 
1. For any and all of what the plaintiffs may recover 
from defendant and third-party plaintiff. 
Clearly, respondent included in its Third-Party 
Complaint a prayer for the same relief against appellant 
as was sought against respondent by plaintiffs. This 
prayer was for specific performance, with money damages 
only as an alternative. 
The judgment of the Court was for specific performance, 
with money damages to be awarded only in the event that 
specific performance was impossible. {TR 184) 
Section 25-5-8, U.C.A. (1953), Statute of~Frauds, 
states: 
Nothing in this chapter contained shall be con-
strued to abridge the powers of courts to 
compel the specific performance of agreements 
in case of part performance thereof. 
Since the present action was for specific performance 
and specific performance was granted, the doctrine of 
part performance was a completely valid argument in re-
spondent's behalf. 
~9-
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The cases relied on by appeallant to establish that 
part performance is not an available argument to defeat 
the Statute of Frauds in an action for monetary damages 
are distinguishable from the present case. In McKinnon 
v. Corporation·, Etc.·,· Latter-day Saints, 529 P. 2d 434 
(Utah 1974), the action was entirely one for monetary 
damages. Specific performance was not even requested. 
But in the present case, specific performance was both 
prayed-for-and decreed by the court. Only because specific 
performance was "impossible" was an alternate judgment 
for money damages declared at all. 
In Ravatino v. Pric·e, 123 Utah 559, 260 P.2d 570 
(1953), the court's statement, quoted by appellant, that 
"It is well settled in this jurisdiction that the Doctrine 
of Part Performance is not available in an action for 
damages on an oral contract to convey land," was mere 
ill-supported dictum, since the court had already reversed 
the trial court's decree for specific performance on the 
grounds that the alleged part performance was insufficient 
to take an oral contract out of the Statute of Frauds 
anyway. 
In Baugh v. Darley, 112 Utah 1, 184 P.2d 335, (1947) the 
Ravarino court's sole support for the "well settled" 
doctrine, again the action was one at la~ only, and no 
specific performance was pled or decreed, as an alternative 
-10-
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or otherwise. 
Respondent contends that the doctrine of part per-
formance should be available in the present case, as 
allowed by the court below. 
POINT II 
THE DOCTRINE OF PART PERFORMANCE AS 
EXCLUDING THE OPERATION OF THE STATUTE 
OF FRAUDS IS VERY BROAD. 
Respondent reiterates part-of appellant's quote from 
Ravarino v. Price, supra, comment 6: 
In.Pr~ce v. Lloyd, 31 Utah 86, 86 P. 767, 
772, 8 L.R.A., N.S., 870, (1906) this court said: 
Courts of equity, in establishing the 
doctrine invoked by plaintiff, have 
not; by any means, intended to annul 
the Statute of Frauds, but only to 
prevent its being· made the means of 
perpetrating a fraud ... 
And in Burns v. McCormick, 233 N.Y. 230, 
135 N.E. 273, 374, (1922) - the -Cou~:t of Appeals of New 
York, through Mr. Justice Cardozo announced: 
The peril of perjury and ~rror is 
latent in the spoken promise. Such, 
.at least, is the warning of the statute, 
-the estimate of policy that finds ex-
pression .. in its mandate. 
Thus, according to Justice Cardozo and this court, 
the primary purpose for the Statute of Frauds is to avoid 
the possibility of perjured testimony of oral contracts. 
Yet, in the case at bar no possibility of perjury con-
cerning the oral contract exists. Indeed, the most favor-
-11-
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able testimony to respondent regarding the oral contract 
was that given by appellant himself. Appellant Campbell, 
testified concerning the oral contract as follo~s (TR 136): 
Q. When did you make that agreement with him [J. Barton]? 
A. That was when we first bought it. 
Q. What date? 
A • Don't ask me, I don't keep dates in my mind that 
. good. 
Q. Okay, Your Earnest Money Agreementwas in June 
of '74., just to refresh yo~r memory. Was it 
.-at that time?· 
A. Well, it was prior to that--I think it was prior 
.to that~signing of the Earnest Money or somewhere 
around that.vicinity. 
Q. I see, so some time prior to June of '74 you 
made an agreement with Mr. Barton to take care 
of the Brough sisters--is that what you are 
saying? 
A. In that vicinity, yes. 
The reason given by Justice Cardozo for invoking 
the Statute of Frauds is not present in the case at bar. 
But the reason for invoking the exception to the Statute 
of Frauds of part performance, as quoted in Pr~ce v. 
Lloyd, supra, is "to prevent its being made the means 
of perpetrating a fraud." The possibility of the Statute 
of Frauds being used to perpetrate a fraud in the present 
case compels allowing the exception. 
Appellant, by his own testimony, admitted having 
made an agreement with respondent to honor the option 
-12-
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of the Brough sisters. This agreement was made to induce 
respondent to sell the subdivision to appellant. If 
appellant, after admitting having made the agreement, 
and after respondent had performed fully by selling the 
property in relience on the promise, were then allowed 
to have the promise declared invalid for the Statute.of 
Frauds, this would put the Statute of Frauds to the very 
use it was intended to prevent. 
Appellant's claim that there was no clear oral agree-
ment is aiso entirely unsupported by the evidence. We 
quote from Campbell's testimony on page. 14L! of the Trial 
Transcript, .lines 4-12: 
Q. Did you ever have any conversation with Mr. 
Jake Barton relative to an agreement which 
he had with the Brough sisters? 
A. Yes. I had this previous negotiation with 
him at the very first when he said that he 
had this obligation. 
Q. Did he represent to you that in fact he felt 
. that he had a right to those two lots? 
A. Oh, very definitely. He asked me if I would, 
you_. know, if I would acknowledge this and I 
told him that dovm the road we would work it 
out. -
Barton testified that the agreement was in fact worked 
out "in quite minute detail prior to going into closing." 
(TR 162) 
The trial court, in its Formal ?indings of Fact, 
paragraph 16, accepted the foregoing testimony to the 
-13-
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effect that appellant, Mr. Campbell, verbally agreed to 
honor the agreement with the Brough sisters. 
Finally, appellant subtitled his second argument 
by claiming that "The Doctrine of Part Performances as 
Excluding the Operation of the Statute of Frauds is Extremely 
Limited." We reiterate 25-5-8, U.C.A. (1953), Statute:,of. 
Frauds, which states, "nothing in this chapter contained 
shall be construed to abridge the powers of courts to 
compel the specific performance of agreements in case 
of part performance thereof." The language of the statute 
makes very plain the desire of the legislature that the 
doctrine of part performance is to have a very broad 
application. Appellant has cited no case law which defeats 
the language of this statute, particularly as applied 
to the facts of the present case, where respondent's 
part of the agreement was fully performed, the oral agree-
ment was admitted by appellant~ specific performance was 
decreed by the court, and a failure to follow the statute 
would allow appellant to perpetrate a fraud. 
POINT III 
APPELLANT'S ORAL PROMISE TO HONOR 
PLAINTIFFS' OPTION FOR TNO LOTS WAS 
PART OF THE ORIGINAL CONSIDERATION 
FOR THE SALE OF THE SUBDIVISION BY 
RESPONDENT TO APPELLANT. 
Viewing appellant Campbell's own testimony most 
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favorably, the oral agreement came, not "on or after July 30, 
1974," ·b\lt "at the very first" (TR 144) "when we first 
bought it" (TR 136), prior to the Earnest Money Agreement 
(TR 136), or "sometime prior to June of '74" (TR 136). 
The record shows that Campbell was very certain in his 
own mind that·he had made an agreement with and was obligated 
to Barton concerning the Brough lots when he first bought 
the subdivision from Barton. In fact, Campbell stated 
that, based on this he would have made a settlement honoring 
the agreement if only Barton had taken the initiative 
by contacting Campbell. (TR 141) 
Thus, Campbell's agreement to honor the Brough option 
was part of the original consideration for the subdivision 
sold by Barton to Campbell. Barton would not have sold 
the property, had Campbell not agreed to honor the Brough 
option. And this was clearly the reason-Campbell agreed 
"when we first bought it" (TR 136) to "work something 
out." 
This was the view accepted by the trial court (Formal 
Findings of Fact, paragraph 14), which further found that 
Barton's obligation on this oral contract was fully per-
formed (Formal Findings of Fact, paragraph 14), which 
performance consisted of the sale and transfer of title 
of the land to Campbell. 
Appellant's cost analysis is completely irrelevant, 
..:.1s-
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since Campbell, had he honored the Brough option, would 
have gotten exactly what he bargained for. , Again, Campbell, 
by his own admission, agreed to deliver the two lots to 
the Brough sisters, should they so choose. By not honoring 
that agreement, Campbell left himself with a windfall--
property worth much more than the $8,500.00 in escrow. 
POINT IV 
THE PRESENT ACTION·IS ONE IN EQUITY FOR 
SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE, AND THIS IS THE 
RELIEF WHICH WAS GRANTED; IN ANY EVENT, 
RESPONDENT SHOULD NOT BE WITHOUT A REME.DY 
MERELY BECAUSE OF THE WAY PLAINTIFFS 
APPROACHED AND PLEADED THE CASE. 
The trial court ruled that "plaintiffs were not 
required to pre-pay the FIVE THOUSAND ($5,000.00) DOLLARS 
for improvements where the defendant refused to convey 
the lots in question." (Conclusions of Law, paragraph 
3) 
Respondent respectfully submits that, were this court 
to reverse the trail court's ruling on this point with 
respect to appellant, the entire decision of the trial 
court should also be reversed with respect to respondent. 
For, if the plaintiffs were not excused from tendering 
the $5,000.00 to Barton, then Barton should not be required 
to perform his part of the contract with plaintiffs. 
Nevertheless, appellant contends that plaintiffs' 
failure to tender the $5,000.00 shows that plaintiffs 
-16-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
never intended to obtain specific performance, and t ri. it 
the action was a legal action for damages, thereby pre-
cluding part performance as a basis for respondent's Third-
Party Complaint.. This contention is inapplicable to the 
present situation. 
It should be pointed out that respondent is in a 
difficult situation regarding the technical distinction 
between actions at law and equity. The present case has 
involved two lawsuits, one by plaintiff against respondent, 
and the other by respondent against appellants. In the 
latter suit, respondent may only recover, at most, what 
plaintiff recovered from respondent in the former suit. 
But respondent is handcuffed in the latter suit by the 
plaintiffs' pleadings in the former sui.t. Thus, had the 
plaintiffs chosen only to seek monetary damages from 
respondent in an action at law, respondent could not then 
seek specific performance against appellant in his Third-
Party Complaint. 
Appellant would have the court believe that because 
this court in past cases_has~refused to allow use of the 
doctrine of part performance in an action at law, under 
very different fact situations, respondent should then 
be without remedy, merely because plaintiffs chose not 
to,seek specific performance. 
Respondent contends that: (1) the;,.'present case is 
~17-
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an action in equity; (2) the relief granted by the court 
was specific performance, an equitable relief; and (3) 
even if this court should find the opposite on both of 
these issues, the Doctrine of Part Performance should 
be allowed to defeat the Statute of Frauds on the unique 
facts of the present case. 
POINT V 
THE ORAL PROMISE MADE BY APPELLANT 
WAS NOT A MODIFICATION OF, BUT A 
PART OF THE ORIGINAL CONTRACT, AND 
THERE ARE SUFFICIENT MEMORANDA TO 
TAKE THE ORAL PROMISE OUT OF THE 
STATUTE OF FRAUDS ANYWAY. 
Appellant's argument that a contract required to 
be in writing cannot be modified by an oral agreement 
is invalid for the following reasons: 
First, as was discussed above, Campbell's promise 
to honor the Brough option was part of the original contract 
between Campbell and Barton. 
Second, both appellant's biief and the evidence were 
ambiguous as to what particular written instrument embodies 
the entire contract. And even were Campbell's promise 
deemed a modification of some written contract, the court 
in Zions Properties, Tnc. v. Holt, 538 P.2d 1319 (1975), 
as quoted by appellant, pointed out that the statute of 
frands applied equally to modifications of contracts as 
well as to original contracts. It follows that the ex-
-:-18-
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ceptions to the statute of frauds should apply to mod if j c.1-
tions also. Thus, in the present case, whether or not 
Campbell's agreement is deemed a modification to or part 
of the original contract, Barton's obligations thereunder 
were fully performed, and the doctrine of part performance 
takes it out . of .. the . Statute of Frauds. 
Third, the memoranda of the oral agreement are much 
more ~bundant in the case at bar than in Zions. There, 
notations on a check were the only concrete evidence of 
the oral agreement. Here, both the written memoranda 
and oral evidence are more than adequate to concretely 
establish the oral contract. The closing statement prepared 
by Mr. Busk of Tracy Collins Bank mentions the $8,500.00 
held in escrow for one acre, to allow for the Brough lots. 
(Defendant's Exhibit 2) Campbell's deposition and testi-
mony shows that he knew what the $8,500.00 was for and 
did not object to its being withheld at the time of closing. 
The Earnest Money Agreement (Defendant's Exhibit 
1), signed by Campbell, specified the purchase price of 
the property at $8,500.00 per acre, which agrees with 
and further supports the escrow agreement. 
The Tracy Mortgage Company check stub (Plaintiff's 
Exhibit C) also mentions a deduction for-·" 2/3 acre in 
2 lots being repurchased." 
And finally, .Mr. Campbell himself testified of his 
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oral agre~ment to assume Barton's obligation to the Brough 
sisters •. 
There can be no question that the oral contract 
eXi$ted, ,:.and the evidence establishes it clearly enough to 
easily satisfy the Statute of Frauds. 
POINT VI 
APPELLANT'S ORAL PROMISE MUST BE DEEMED 
AN ORIGINAL OBLIGATION AND NEED NOT BE 
IN WRITING. 
Section 25-5-6, U.C.A. (1953), Statute of 
states in pertinent part: 
A promise to answer for the obligation of 
.another in any of the following cases is 
deemed an original obligation of the 
promiser and need not be in writing: 
(1) Where the promise is made b-y one who has 
received property of another upon an undertaking 
to apply it pursuant to such promise, or -cby one 
who ::has received a dischar<Je-- from an. obligation 
in whole or in part in.considE!£ation of such. 
promise. 
The only case law applicabl~ to this statute is Kahn 
v. Perry Zolezzi, Inc., 119 Utah 256, 226 P.2d 118 (1950), 
where the defendant corporation agreed to assume an obliga-
11,fl' 
tion of one of. the incorporators on a note upon receiving 
' ' . ~ \' -~ ,... 
property from the incorporator equal to the amount of 
the note. In holding that the defendant corporation was 
bound to its agreement under §25-5-6 U.C.A (1953), this 
court said: 
-20-
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So concluding, it is not necc':>sary to determine 
whether or not there is sufficient memoranda in 
writing of the agreement of the corporate defendant 
to take the case from the Statute of Frauds. 
In the case at bar, Campbell, the promiser, received 
property f rorn Barton upon undertaking to apply the property 
in answering for Barton's obligation to the Brough sisters. 
This is a situation clearly within the meaning of Section 
25-5-6. The equities of the present case are also clearly 
deserving of the application of Section 25-5-6 in upholding 
the trial court's decision. Campbell's promise should 
be deemed an original obliation and need not be in writing. 
POINT VII 
THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS DOES NOT APPLY TO AN 
ACTION FOR SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE OF A 
CONTRACT WEICH HAS BEEN PARTLY PERFORMED. 
The present case also falls under Section 25-5-8, 
U.C.A. (1953), Statute of Frauds, which states that: 
Nothing in this chapter contained shall be con-
strued to abridge the powers of courts to compel 
the specific performance of _agreements in case of 
part performance thereof. 
As has been discussed above, the present case is 
among those intended to be reached by this statute. 
POINT VIII 
THIS COURT HAS TENDED TO BE PARTICULARLY 
\'JILLING TO ALLOW AN ORAL CONTRACT TO STlu-m 
WHERE ITS EXISTE1JCE IS iill~lITTED BY THE PARTY 
AGAINST WHrn-1 IT IS BE n;G EHFORCED. 
In In re Roth's Estate, 2 Utah 2c 40, 269 P.2d 278, (1954} 
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in an action between two remainderman to have property 
sold and proceeds divided, defendant counterclaimed for 
specific performance of an oral agreement by plaintiff 
to sell his interest to defendant. Plaintiff-appellant 
contended that no oral contract existed, but his own 
testimony showed that an agreement did exist. In granting 
specific performance to defendant, this court stated: 
... we think that inasmuch as the appellant's 
own testimony establishes an oral agreement 
on his part to sell his interest in the 
property to his brother we are warranted in 
concluding that the acts of part performance 
were done in relience on that contract. In 
J o·ne s v. Jon e·s , 3 3 3 Mo . 4 7 8 , 6 3 S . W. 2d 14 6 , 
90 A. L. R. 219, (1933). arid iI). Higgins· v •. _Exchange 
Nat. Bank, 142 Misc. 69, 253 N.Y.S.- 859., (1931) 
was held that where the existence of the 
oral contract is established by an admission 
of the party resisting specific performance 
or by competent evidence independent of the 
acts of part performance1 the requirement 
that the acts of pa_rt performance must be 
exclusive referable to the oral contract is 
satisfied. Corbin on Contracts, Sec. 430, 
approves the holding of" those cases. 
Even should this court find the written memoranda 
establishing an oral contract to be not quite sufficient 
to satisfy the .Statute of Frauds, the fact that appellant 
himself testified as to the oral contract should allow 
the court to find in favor of respondent. 
-22-
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CONCLUSION 
Campbell, from the beginning of his negotiations 
with Barton was aware of the obligation to the Brough 
sisters and agreed to assume that obligation. The memo-
randa of the parties to the sale of the land substantiate 
and verify the details of that agreement and therefore 
remove this case from the Statute of Frauds relating to 
the transfer .. of real property. Additionally the statutes 
of the State of Utah specifically lift this case from 
the defense of Statute of Frauds and the decision of the 
trial court should be affirmed. 
DATED this / L /}-day of June, 19 80. 
BEAN, BEAN & SMEDLEY 
' STANLEY M SMED 
Attorney for Third-Party 
Plain iff-Respondent 
190 South Fort Lane, Suite 2 
Layton, Utah 84041 
Telephone: 376-4221 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE BY MAIL 
I certify that on this /.CZtf day of June, 1980, I 
served a copy of the foregoing Brief of Third-Party 
Plaintiff, Barton Brothers Investment Corporation, on 
George K. Fadel, Attorney for Third-Party Defendant, 
170 West Fourth South, Bountiful, Utah 84010 and to 
Rodney s. Page, Attorney for Plaintiffs, 40 South 125 
East, Clearfield, Utah 84015, by mailing said copy to 
said attorneys, postage prepaid. 
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